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Abstract 
A successful transition into the knowledge economy depends upon higher level skills, 
creating unprecedented pressure on university systems to provide labour markets with 
the skills needed. But what are the political economy dynamics underlying national 
patterns of high skill formation? The article proposes a framework to theorise the 
relationship between higher education systems and knowledge-based labour markets 
based on two dimensions: the type of knowledge economy predominant in a given 
country and the extent of inter-university competition. It is argued that the former 
explains what type of higher level skills will be sought by employers and cultivated by 
governments, while the latter helps us understanding why some higher education 
systems are more open to satisfying labour market demands compared to others. A set 
of diverse country case studies (Britain, Germany, South Korea and the Netherlands) is 
employed to illustrate the theory.  
 
Keywords 
Knowledge economy; higher education; skill formation; institutional change; varieties 
of capitalism. 
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Introduction 
Scholars have noted how the transition to the knowledge economy has prompted 
institutional changes across policy areas (Ibsen and Thelen 2017; Iversen and Soskice 
2015a; Hall 2015; Hassel and Palier 2017; Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). In the 
transition, one of the chief challenges facing governments has been ‘how to cultivate 
the skills required for non-routine positions’ (Hall 2015, 26) and higher education has 
emerged as a central tool to tackle this challenge (Hall 2015, 29). In this context, 
universities have come increasingly under pressure from policy-makers and businesses 
to form the ‘new’ knowledge workers and to contribute to national economic 
competitiveness (OECD 2004, 2012).  
Pressures to align higher education to the needs of knowledge-based labour 
markets have translated however into distinct national trajectories of institutional 
change. Firstly, universities have opposed this process in some countries (e.g. 
Germany) while they have accepted – or even driven – it in others (e.g. the UK). 
Secondly, governments intervened strongly in shaping the supply of high skills in some 
countries (e.g. in Japan and South Korea) while they refrained from doing so in others 
(e.g. in the UK). More broadly, research shows significant variation as to how the skill 
formation process unfolds across national higher education systems (De Weert 2011; 
Regini 2011).  
What explains this variation? The article seeks to answer this question in three 
steps: firstly, it shows that existing theories fall short of compelling explanations; 
secondly, it proposes an alternative theory inspired by the emergence over the last two 
decades of knowledge-based growth regimes and by the early literature on higher 
education systems; thirdly, building on 55 interviewsi and document analysis, it tests 
the theory through case studies of institutional change in Britain, Germany and South 
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Korea and a shadow case of the Netherlands, where continuity prevailed over change. 
The dependent variable is ‘high skill formation’, as defined by adapting standard 
definitions of ‘skill formation’ (see e.g. Busemeyer and Vossiek 2016, 151) to the 
higher education sector. Specifically, high skill formation is defined as: the institutional 
set-up of a higher education system and its connection to the labour market, in particular 
to those segments of the labour market that are reliant on high skills (such as advanced 
manufacturing and dynamic services). 
 
Higher Education and Labour Markets: Existing Theories 
The question of how higher education systems align with labour markets was first 
tackled in the 1970s when a wave of expansion of higher education prompted the 
establishment of a tier of labour market-oriented higher education institutions by 
upgrading upper-secondary vocational institutions to the tertiary level. This strategy 
allowed governments to pursue simultaneously two goals: they could accommodate a 
growing proportion of secondary school-leavers seeking tertiary education; and they 
could counter fears of academic drift implied by the expansion of higher education 
exclusively in research universities (Grubb 1985; Trow 1974). Yet, this functional 
explanation based on the idea of expansion leading to horizontal differentiation does 
not travel well across time and space. As university systems expanded further, 
horizontal differentiation did not appear as the unequivocal policy response. Rather, 
several disjointed developments took place: some countries abolished the binary system 
in the 1990s (Britain) while others introduced it (Austria) and yet others maintained it 
(Germany; the Netherlands). Thus, a functional model of expansion and differentiation 
does not help us understanding the dynamics of alignment between higher education 
and labour market (Teichler 2006). 
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A second stream of literature highlights the diffusion of neoliberal ideas that 
pushed policy-makers to reframe higher education policy as an element of national 
economic competitiveness. As part of this strategic re-orientation, it is argued that 
universities were incentivised to create links with employers and prioritise those 
disciplines (e.g. hard sciences) that are thought of as having a strategic place in the 
knowledge economy vis-à-vis disciplines deemed of lower economic interest (e.g. 
humanities) (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; George 2006; Olssen and Peters 2005; 
Pritchard 2011). Yet, ideational approaches suggest an underlying convergent trend that 
is hardly traceable once the relevant policy initiatives and the responses of the higher 
education sector are analysed. As Christine Musselin puts it, this literature convincingly 
shows convergence in what policy-makers think a higher education system ought to be 
but not necessarily in what a higher education system is (Musselin 2011, 461-6).  
As theories positing convergence find limited empirical support, we move to 
the comparative political economy (CPE) and the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
literature in particular, in search for lenses through which to theorise variation. Yet, we 
still fall short of convincing explanations. The CPE literature suggests that a major 
source of variation across models of skill formation lies precisely in the lack of higher 
education expansion in those countries commonly referred to as Coordinated Market 
Economies (CMEs) (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Hassel and Palier 2017; 
but see Graf 2017, for a notable exception). CMEs are expected to keep their university 
systems limited in favour of large vocational training systems that serve manufacturing-
centred production regimes in need of ‘specific’ skills. Conversely, countries relying 
on ‘general’ skills and primarily identified in the Anglo-American Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs) are expected to display large higher education systems. Yet, while 
accurate until the 1990s, such binary distinction holds increasingly less explanatory 
5 
 
power as enrolment rates in higher education have been booming across countries, 
including those where this development was least expected (Durazzi and Benassi 2018; 
Baethge and Wolter 2015), such as the East Asian and Continental European CMEs.  
Lastly, a stream of CPE research theorised the partisan politics of higher 
education (Ansell 2008; Busemeyer 2009Garritzmann 2016). These analyses shed light 
on party preferences for higher education and their distributional implications. Yet, a 
partisan political angle does not offer solid ground to theorise trajectories of high skill 
formation. Specifically, even if we assumed that right and left parties have 
systematically different preferences for labour market outcomes (Hibbs 1977), we 
would still expect both left and right to favour the alignment between higher education 
and labour market needs. For the former this would be a way to favour higher 
employment rates, while for the latter it would be a way to satisfy business’ skills needs. 
High skill formation, in other words, fits squarely with the notion of politics for markets 
(Iversen and Soskice 2015b), whereby cross-party efforts are expected to provide the 
most competitive sectors of the economy with an appropriate institutional 
infrastructure. 
 
Theorising High Skill Formation 
How can we then theorise the relationship between higher education ad knowledge-
based labour markets? This section puts forward an alternative theory that rests on two 
core propositions: firstly, distinct knowledge economy profiles have emerged across 
countries and these thrive on different types of high skills; secondly, universities are 
embedded in institutional contexts providing them with different incentive sets in the 
relationship with governments and business.  
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The Demand for High Skills: Varieties of Knowledge Economies 
Knowledge economies are denoted by common attributes, namely ‘greater dependence 
on knowledge, information and high skill levels’ (OECD 2005). Yet, they also vary 
significantly with respect to the weight of specific economic sectors, as illustrated in 
table 1, which ranks major OECD economies according to the contribution to Gross 
Value Added (GVA) of manufacturing and dynamic services.ii 
[Table 1 near here] 
I suggest that disentangling the convergent trend of higher education expansion in the 
context of persistent differences in national economic structures is crucial to explain 
the emergence of distinct trajectories of high skill formation. In particular, I argue that 
different ‘families’ of academic disciplines are complementary to different economic 
sectors and different economic sectors have, in turn, broad or narrow requirements in 
terms of high skills needed.  
A short example illustrates this point: let us assume a knowledge economy 
based on advanced manufacturing (e.g. industry 4.0) vis-à-vis a knowledge economy 
relying on high-end services (e.g. the financial sector). The high skill implications differ 
significantly: while both types will be requiring high inter-personal and cognitive skills 
(e.g. problem solving or analytical skills, which potentially come with a university 
education regardless of the specific discipline), high-end manufacturing will be also in 
need of highly skilled workers from a relatively narrow set of disciplines – namely 
STEM graduates. Knowledge economies based on high-end services, conversely, will 
be much less constrained by the discipline background, as long as high ‘general’ skills 
are present. They rely, in other words, on a broad set of high skills. In more practical 
terms, while both STEM and social science graduates might successfully find 
employment in, say, the financial industry, it is much more likely that the 
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manufacturing industry needs exclusively STEM graduates for a significant number of 
key positions.  
This line of reasoning helps explaining why a shortage in STEM graduates is 
often part of the discourse: STEM graduates are, on one hand, sought by employers in 
‘non-STEM-related’ occupations, and, on the other, employers in ‘STEM-related’ 
occupations necessarily need STEM graduates (see e.g. Cedefop 2016). Furthermore, 
the sociology of education demonstrated that labour  market  signals are only one 
among several factors influencing degree choice (Briggs 2006; Reay et al. 2001),  and  
that  STEM  disciplines  are  often  those  avoided  by  students (see Haynes 2008, for 
a review of the reasons).  
Hence, as far as the demand for high skills is concerned, we advance the 
following theoretical proposition: in countries that assign a strategic role to advanced 
manufacturing – and where employers have rather narrow skill needs – governments 
intervene more directly and actively to ensure the availability of STEM skills compared 
to countries pursuing knowledge-based growth centred on high-end services. In the 
latter, the political pressures to intervene in the supply of high skills are expected to be 
more modest as employers are relatively indifferent to the type of high skills supplied 
by the higher education system.  
 
The Supply of High Skills: University Agency in Context 
The development of knowledge economies triggered an interest by external actors in 
higher education to ‘an extent previously unknown’ (Regini 2011, 203). Yet, 
universities ‘are not simply acted upon by outside forces’ (Slaughter and Barrett 2016, 
1). In particular, redefining universities’ educational offer to meet labour market 
demands is a political process, which entails eroding part of the academic freedom 
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retained by universities as to what and how should be taught. Borrowing Korpi’s 
categories, (when) should universities be expected to act as ‘protagonists’, ‘consenters’ 
or ‘antagonists’ (Korpi 2006)?  
The early literature on higher education provides significant insights to 
hypothesise a theoretically-informed answer. Seminal work by Burton Clark 
conceptualises university systems as being caught in a triangular tension between 
markets, states or academic oligarchies as key organising principle. He argues that 
systems that rely on markets are the most amenable to change as they might be willing 
to engage ‘in claims of “product differentiation” as a way of attracting consumers and 
thereby building a dependable base of support in a hived-off segment of the market’ 
(Clark 1983, 162) making market-heavy higher education systems open ‘to change and 
adaptable to new environmental demands’ (Clark 1983, 204). The point put forward by 
Clark can be understood in terms of what incentive-set universities are faced with, 
depending on whether they operate in a more or less ‘market-like’ environment. This 
dimension is captured in figure 1 through the share of private spending in higher 
education – which is strongly driven by tuition fees, i.e. the crucial element identified 
by Clark as characterising market-based models.iii  
[Figure 1 near here] 
As far as the supply of high skills is concerned, we advance therefore the 
following theoretical proposition: universities operating in highly-competitive 
institutional contexts will be relatively more open to the demands of external 
stakeholders (acting as protagonists of or consenters to change) compared to 
universities operating in low-competition settings (acting rather as antagonists of 
change). The role of universities has implications for patterns of institutional change. 
In particular, low competition settings – and the inter-related universities’ ‘antagonism’ 
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– approximate what Mahoney and Thelen (2009, 19) identify as a political context 
characterised by strong veto possibilities. In such context, it is expected that 
institutional change will be, at least initially, marginal, e.g. by side-stepping veto-
players, as opposed to encompassing, i.e. affecting the entire higher education system.  
 
Piecing Demand and Supply Together 
The two previous sub-sections argued that trajectories of high skill formation can be 
understood within a bi-dimensional space in which the type of knowledge economy and 
the degree of inter-university competition shape the specific pattern of high skill 
formation that we observe in a given country, as captured in figure 2.  
[Figure 2 near here] 
Given the bi-dimensional space, we opt for a ‘diverse cases’ design (Seawright and 
Gerring 2008) to test the theory. We select two cases of knowledge economies geared 
towards the advanced manufacturing (Germany and Korea), but differing in the degree 
of inter-university competition (low in Germany and high in Korea); and two cases that 
share a knowledge economy based on dynamic services (Britain and the Netherlands) 
but that also have distinct higher education systems, characterised by high competition 
in Britain and low competition in the Netherlands. The empirical investigation focuses 
primarily on the period from the mid-1990s onwards, i.e. when (most) advanced 
political economies started pursuing patterns of knowledge-based growth (Hall 2015). 
 
Britain: Universities’ Protagonism and General Skill Formation 
High skill formation became a salient issue in British higher education policy in the 
1990s, in connection with the increasing importance assigned to knowledge-based 
economic growth (Wilson 2012, 18). The key piece of higher education policy 
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commissioned by the government in the 1990s – the Dearing report – pointed to the 
expansion of employment in the service sector as a key socio-economic trend (Dearing 
1997, 56). As hypothesised, the Dearing report linked the expansion of service-based 
employment to the development of ‘generic or transferable skills which are valuable to 
many contexts’ (Dearing 1997, 59). If we analyse the extent to which degree 
programmes have been ‘converted’ to meet the aims set out by Dearing, we note a 
striking correspondence between what was demanded and how universities redesigned 
their programmes. Universities UK – representing all British universities – illustrated 
the commitment of the higher education sector to even ‘go beyond the proposals in the 
Dearing Report’ and ‘to develop a long-term […] strategy for employability that 
maximises links with employers, [and] embeds employability in the curriculum’ (UUK 
2002, 5-6). 
Yet, neither the Dearing Report nor any reform provided explicit regulation to 
guide universities through such process of recalibration of their curricular offer. Why 
did universities then comply with these demands? The increasing dependence of 
universities on student fees since the late 1990s in the context of a ‘real market’ for 
higher education (Shattock 2012, 155) emerged as the key driver of engagement with 
employers. A representative of a think-tank promoting dialogue between universities 
and businesses illustrated how such engagement was driven by ‘the growing number of 
students who, in the context of increasing cost and risk of the investment in higher 
education, are more concerned with employability and labour market outcomes’ 
(interview UK_6). Indeed, we find at the macro-level a positive correlation between the 
extent to which students support the involvement of employers in course design and the 
extent to which they pay tuition fees (Durazzi 2018): according to Eurobarometer data, 
British students are among those in Western Europe that see more favourably the 
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involvement of private firms in higher education management and curricular design 
(Gallup 2009, 43).  
In this context, it is not surprising the otherwise rather ‘curious’ coalition 
between the National Union of Students (NUS) and the Confederation of British 
Business (CBI) that produced in 2011 a joint policy paper on how to make their 
curricula more attuned to labour market needs so that they ‘can help students achieve a 
return on their investment by securing good jobs’ (CBI and NUS 2011, 5). Universities, 
aware of students’ expectations and of the competitive market within which they 
operate, strategically placed skill formation at the core of their offer. This reasoning 
emerges from the policy positions of university associations that illustrate how 
enhancing institutional reputation is a key factor for universities’ engagement with 
employers (University Alliance 2015, 11; CFE Research 2014, 7-14).  
Universities strove therefore to increase the provision of professional skills, 
proactively sought employers’ views and embedded these into curricula (interviews 
UK_ 12, UK_18, UK_20). As they engaged with employers in the design of curricula, 
the structural composition of the labour market, heavily geared towards the service 
sector, pulled the educational offer of universities towards general skills – as 
hypothesised in the theoretical framework and as anticipated by the Dearing report. 
Particularly enlightening in this respect was the reflection of interviewees who 
described how in STEM subjects, the university underwent a process to make the 
degrees less narrowly focussed on technical issues and more focussed on broad general 
skills, because ‘people often think that engineering graduates would go into engineering 
jobs but that is almost a minority, they are going to many other sectors such as 
consultancy, finance’ (interview UK_12). Graduate employment data corroborate this 
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assessment: high-end services receive the majority of engineering graduates (HESA 
2016). 
Thus, the British case offers a picture of proactive engagement of universities, 
which acted as ‘protagonists’, to align their educational offer to labour market demands, 
primarily driven by strategic considerations in the context of a highly competitive 
higher education market. The type of skills offered were in turn strongly shaped by a 
labour-market heavily geared towards high-end services, prompting the prioritisation 
of general skills in university curricula. A similar strategic reasoning was found across 
institutions that are commonly perceived as more and less prestigious, although the 
urgency of developing tight links with employers was higher in the latter. Relatively 
more prestigious institutions tended to introduce rather limited changes to ensure that 
they would not fall behind in rankings, while radical changes were more common in 
less prestigious institutions, driven by fears of insufficient student recruitment (see 
section 4.3 in Durazzi 2018).  
 
Germany: Feeding a Separate Layer, Nurturing Engineers 
The higher education system in Germany has been traditionally limited in size (Ansell 
2008)  and dominated by the ‘academic oligarchy’ in research universities (Clark 1983). 
These historically accounted for a much larger share of the student population than 
universities of applied sciences, a sub-set of higher education institutions established in 
the 1960s with strong links with the labour market. Indeed, the development of the latter 
was kept at bay by politically powerful research universities who feared the transfer of 
resources that an expansion of universities of applied sciences would have entailed 
(Toens 2009). As a result, only a minority of higher education students were 
traditionally enrolled in universities of applied science (typically less than one third). 
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In the late 1990s, this picture changed radically. Higher education started 
expanding significantly (Baethge and Wolter 2015) and in this context the public 
perception of universities changed too: they were no longer seen as the place educating 
the elites but they were asked to align closely with societal demands, including taking 
on an unprecedented skill formation role (BMBF 1999; BDA 2003). Governments and 
businesses put pressure particularly on research universities given that they 
accommodated the majority of students and given their traditional reluctance to engage 
with labour market demands (Wissenschaftsrat 2000, 15; Toens 2009). Yet, despite a 
powerful government-business alliance, the reform process was at best incomplete 
(BDA et al. 2009; BMBF 2007). Relatively insulated from competitive pressures, 
research universities defended the status quo as they argued that restructuring their 
degrees consistently with employers’ and government’s demands would lead to a 
downgrading of university education to short-term training (interviews DE_15, DE_16, 
DE_20). The antagonist role of universities was recognized by governments and 
employers as they argued that the transition to a more practice-oriented higher 
education did not achieve significant results (BDA 2006; BMBF 2007) and ascribed 
the truncated reform to an obstruction ‘on the ground’ by the ‘academic oligarchy’ 
(Gillmann 2006, interview DE_4).  
Yet, a further wave of rapid expansion provided the functional underpinnings 
for the government to devise a strategy that could simultaneously satisfy employers 
while circumventing the de facto veto point of research universities. Net entry rates 
skyrocketed from 36% to over 50% between 2007 and 2012 (Hüther and Krücken 2014, 
104). Employers put the expansion of STEM skills at the heart of their demands as the 
lack of over 70,000 engineers in 2007 alone was perceived to threaten the backbone of 
the export-led German economy (BDA 2008). In this context, the interests of businesses 
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converged not only with those of the government, but also with those of universities of 
applied sciences. The latter, which have traditionally had engineering at the core of 
their educational offer, stood to gain financially from additional resources poured into 
those disciplines and institutions that aligned the most with labour market needs. 
Simultaneously, the government would have provided businesses with the high skills 
needed (VDI 2016, , interviews DE_6, DE_7). This alignment of strategic interests 
found its policy implementation in the Higher Education Pact (HEP), which provided 
additional funds to higher education institutions with the specific commitment to 
increase study places in STEM subjects and universities of applied sciences (BMBF 
2009). 
The crucial difference from previous failed attempts to expand universities of 
applied sciences laid in the context of rapid expansion of higher education, which 
allowed governments to deploy a strategy of differential growth, i.e. feeding 
universities of applied sciences more than traditional universities (interviews DE_6, 
DE_7), rather than shifting resources from the latter to the former, thus effectively side-
stepping the opposition of traditional universities. Indeed, following the 
implementation of the HEP, the distribution of high skills changed significantly to the 
primary benefit of engineering and universities of applied sciences (GWK 2016; 
Durazzi and Benassi 2018, 8-9). Government officials reported how campaigns 
conducted by business made public opinion and policy-makers aware of the shortage 
of STEM skills (Durazzi and Benassi 2018, 9-10). Employers themselves argued in 
2015 that ‘years of public campaigns for more engineers and technical skills have paid 
off’ and that given the increase in new entrants in engineering degrees since 2008, ‘the 
lack of skilled labour is no longer a threat’ (Gillmann 2015).  
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The German case mirrors the British case, as expected, along both variables. On 
the supply side, universities resisted the call to engage more with employers and satisfy 
the needs of the labour market, performing the hypothesised ‘antagonist’ role. In this 
context, institutional change proceeded mostly through governments feeding a separate 
layer of the higher education system, namely that of universities of applied sciences, 
which, unlike traditional universities, were ready to meet labour market demands. On 
the demand side, the strategic reliance on advanced manufacturing determined that the 
expansion of higher education was channelled particularly into those disciplines – 
STEM, and engineering in particular – that were deemed crucial for the success of this 
sector. 
 
South Korea: Replacing Humanities and Social Sciences with Engineering 
The 1990s brought about sharp changes in the Korean political economy, primarily 
through liberalizing reforms (Fleckenstein and Lee 2017). The university sector was 
part and parcel of the liberalization process as the government actively promoted a 
market-based expansion of higher education, financed for the most part through private 
resources, in the form of tuition fees (Green 2015; Park 2013). GER in tertiary 
education almost trebled between 1990 and 2013 and Korea quickly became one of the 
OECD countries most heavily relying on private financing (recall figure 3) (Kim and 
Lee 2006). Universities found themselves in a fiercely competitive environment as they 
not only strived to attract student fees but also government funding (interviews KR_6, 
KR_14), 90% of which was also competitively allocated (Shin 2012).  
Yet, a large university system characterized by intense competition, while 
heralded in the early 1990s as crucial for a successful transition into the knowledge 
economy (Park 2013, 301), did not deliver the results that the government had expected 
16 
 
(Cheon 2014, 224). Problems of skills shortages arose already in the early 2000s and 
businesses complained for the lack of STEM graduates, particularly in engineering 
(Yonezawa and Kim 2008, 206; KEF 2005). In response, successive governments tried 
to adjust higher education provision with labour market needs.  
Two policies stand out in this respect: Leaders in Industry-University 
Cooperation (LINC) and Program for Industry-Matched Education (PRIME). In both 
cases, the government offered financial support to selected universities to ensure that 
they provided the skills needed in the labour market (interviews KR_1, KR_3, KR_6, 
KR_14). Since 2012, LINC has provided funding to over 50 universities ‘to match the 
educational and research activities […] to the demands of industry’. PRIME, instead, 
intervened directly on the distribution of high skills following a 2014 report of the 
Ministry of Employment and Labour titled ‘Prospects of Manpower Conditions 
Classified by Majors from 2014 to 2024’ which noted an over-supply of social science 
and liberal arts graduates and an under-supply of STEM graduates, despite employment 
outlooks were considerably more favourable for the latter (cf. Park 2016). As a 
consequence, the government actively stepped in to shape the supply of high skills: 
public financial support has been granted to universities that agreed to downsize their 
humanities and social science departments to increase enrolments in STEM, according 
to governments’ skills forecasts (MOSF 2015, 2).  
As in the German case, lobbying from businesses for more STEM graduates has 
been identified as a driver of policy (interview KR_1), but, differently from the German 
case, the government did not face significant opposition from universities, who rather 
consented to change. Data on the implementation of LINCiv shows how the pattern of 
conversion of curricular offer has been taking place across the entire higher education 
sector. Tables 2 compares the success at attracting LINC funds for research universities 
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and their professionally-oriented counterparts, i.e. junior colleges, and they show that 
the former have been both more active and more successful than the latter. 
[Table 2 near here] 
The incentive-set to satisfy government’s demands was directly linked to the highly 
competitive pressures that universities are subject to: as universities compete for funds, 
students and positions in ranking, taking part in government-sponsored projects was 
perceived both as a strategy to attract additional funds and as a way to promote the 
university’s reputation towards perspective applicants (interviews KR_1; KR_3; KR_4; 
KR_14).  
As expected, the Korean case shares similarities and differences with both the 
German and British cases. Similarly to Germany, the government prioritised the supply 
of STEM skills, which were considered pivotal for the success of the Korean export-
oriented manufacturing sector. But similarly to Britain, the pattern of institutional 
change affected the higher education system at large, due to the competitive pressures 
that universities are subject to. 
 
The Netherlands: High Skills in Political-Economic Equilibrium 
The Dutch case illustrates yet another logic of adjustment, dominated by continuity 
over change. Indeed, the largest share of higher education students were traditionally 
enrolled in vocationally-oriented higher education institutions, making the Dutch 
university system aligned with labour market needs ‘at the outset’. The comparison is 
particularly stark with Germany in highlighting how the ‘centre of gravity’v of the 
Dutch higher education system is located in the hogeschool sector, i.e. its vocational 
sub-set (see table 3). 
[Table 3 near here] 
18 
 
Reconstructing the reform process, Witte finds that: ‘massification in the 
Netherlands was by and large accommodated by the hogeschool sector […]. 
Accordingly, the pressure to “professionalise” university degrees was quite low’ 
(Witte 2006, 209 emphasis added; see also Huisman and Kaiser 2001). As expected, 
(traditional) universities objected to any potential transformation of their own degrees 
towards closer labour-market orientation (i.e. they performed the hypothesised 
‘antagonist’ role) (Witte 2006, 377; Lorenz 2006). Critically, policy-makers sided with 
(research) universities – instead of putting pressure on them – because of the 
historically-inherited skewed distribution of students in favour of vocational higher 
education institutions, which, unlike the German case, made it unnecessary to push 
traditional universities towards a professionalisation of their degrees. vi 
Furthermore, the Dutch hogeschool sector was traditionally seen as extremely 
responsive to societal needs, thus making it a particularly suitable target for government 
policy when adjustments in the higher education sector were required (Teichler 1989; 
Maassen, Moen, and Stensaker 2011). Consistently with these assessments, the 
association of the hogescholen (HBO-i) has been actively involved in policy initiatives 
bringing together government and industry and aimed at adjusting the provision of 
higher education to the needs of the Dutch knowledge economy, through the 
development of ICT-related degree programmes (HBO-i 2010). This initiative 
conforms with the provision of high general skills, as universities of applied sciences 
embed ICT components across very different degrees ranging from ICT and business 
administration to ICT and software engineering. The wide applicability of the ICT 
degrees is also confirmed by the cross-section of firms that have contributed to the 
development of the degrees, covering sectors as diverse as software development, 
management consultancy, and finance (HBO-i 2010, 74). 
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Thus, a large professionally-oriented higher education system created the 
conditions for a political-economic equilibrium, in which the government had weak 
incentives to deviate from the existing system (Witte 2006, 371). Yet, despite the 
prevalence of continuity over change, the Dutch case also conforms to the theoretical 
framework. As in the German case, the alignment of higher education and the labour 
market was primarily channelled through the vocational sub-set of the higher education 
system (which however, compared to the German case, did not need ‘additional’ 
expansion). However, differently from the German and Korean cases, the government 
did not intervene to shape the supply of skills.  
 
Conclusions 
This article sought to explain how advanced capitalist countries create the high skills 
needed to succeed in knowledge-based labour markets. In doing so, it provided a single 
theoretical framework to make sense of the political economy of high skill formation 
across (advanced) manufacturing and (high-end) services, overcoming a traditional 
limitation of the literature on skill formation, namely its bias towards the manufacturing 
sector. It has been argued that trajectories of high skill formation can be understood 
through the interaction of two main variables: the dominant knowledge-based regime 
in a given country (in particular, advanced-manufacturing versus high-end services) 
and the incentive-set available to universities in a given higher education system to 
satisfy the demands of external stakeholders (chiefly, governments and employers). The 
former explains whether governments will take a pro-active role in shaping the supply 
of high skills, while the latter explains whether universities will be open to meeting the 
demands of governments and employers.  
Three broader implications emerge from the analysis. Firstly, the article 
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highlights the role of universities as important political agents for patterns of 
institutional change in contemporary higher education systems, which calls for a 
systematic theorisation of the role of universities beyond the case of high skill 
formation. Secondly, the political economy of high skill formation points to a different 
constellation of actors compared to the ‘traditional’ political economy of skill 
formation. While the latter has been primarily understood as the outcome of different 
interactions between employers and unions, the former identifies governments, 
universities and employers – and their mutual and different relationships across 
contexts – as the key constellation of actors underpinning national trajectories of high 
skill formation. Thirdly, the article shows that advanced capitalist countries maintain 
their diversity even as they increasingly rely on the same policy areas. In particular, the 
article showed how CMEs have creatively adapted to their needs a policy area like 
higher education that was traditionally thought of as successfully complementing 
production regimes of LMEs. 
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Endnotes
i See online supplemental material for details of interviewees. 
ii I am grateful to David Hope for making available to me the dataset on GVA used in 
this section. He should not be implicated for how the data has been elaborated and/or 
presented. 
iii A more detailed indicator of competition suggests that share of private financing is a 
reliable proxy as it correlates with other dimensions of competition, such as survey data 
on students’ perception of the importance of rankings and of universities’ prestige (see 
section 2.2 in Durazzi 2018).  
iv To the best of my knowledge, data on the implementation of PRIME with a similar 
level of detail have not been released at the time of writing. 
vv I am grateful to Kathleen Thelen for her advice to look for the ‘centre of gravity’, 
although she should not be implicated for what has been identified as such. 
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Table 1: Major sectors as a % of GVA in 2011 
Country Manufacturing Country Dynamic services 
Korea 31.1% UK 28.1% 
Ireland 26.8% US 25.5% 
Germany 22.4% Ireland 23.8% 
Finland 18.6% Netherlands 22.8% 
Japan 18.6% Belgium 22.6% 
Austria 18.5% France 21.4% 
Canada 16.7% Australia 20.9% 
Sweden 16.7% Germany 19.5% 
Italy 16.6% Sweden 18.5% 
Belgium 14.5% Denmark 17.6% 
Netherlands 14.1% Italy 16.9% 
US 12.3% Austria 16.4% 
UK 11.7% Korea 15.7% 
Denmark 11.5% Japan 15.4% 
France 10.1% Canada 15.2% 
Australia 8.5% Finland 14.5% 
Average 16.8% Average 19.7% 
St Dev 5.8% St Dev 3.9% 
Source: WIOD (2014) 
Note: Bold indicates above average countries-values. 
 
Table 2: The engagement of universities with LINC 
Year 
LINC budget of universities / total LINC 
budget 
Universities implementing LINC / 
higher education institutions 
implementing LINC 
2012 93% 63% 
2013 91% 64% 
2014 92% 65% 
Source: own calculations based on MoE (2018) 
 
Table 3: Identifying the centre of gravity of higher education systems in the second half of the 1990s 
Country Share of students in research 
universities 
Share of students in universities of 
applied sciences 
Germany 76% 24% 
Netherlands 37% 63% 
Source: Huisman and Kaiser (2001)  
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Figure 1: Share of private financing of higher education (2011) 
 
Source: OECD (2017) 
Figure 2: A bi-dimensional categorisation according to ‘type’ of knowledge economy and inter-
university competition 
 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2017) and WIOD (2014)  
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